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The resumed fifth Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC-5.2) for a United Nations (UN) Plastics Treaty recently concluded in Geneva without a finalized text. Throughout the negotiations, petrostates and countries heavily influenced by the plastics and fossil fuel industries consistently opposed critical provisions needed to reduce plastic pollution, favoring voluntary, downstream measures instead.
While the Chair proposed draft treaty texts that would have catered to fossil fuel and chemical lobby interests, ambitious countries successfully rejected these weakened proposals, which would have failed to address the global crisis. Though their pushback leaves the door open for future action, the process is again extended with a as yet unscheduled session, leaving countries deeply divided and facing dwindling funds for further negotiations. Further, the news of Chair Luis Vayas Valdivieso stepping down in October 2025 from his role leaves uncertainty of who will fill the seat and lead the INC process forward. On February 7, 2026, delegates will reconvene for one day to elect a new chair. The question now is: Where do we go from here, and how do we avoid repeating past mistakes?
Barriers to Success: Conflicts of Interest and Consensus-Based Negotiations
The road forward after INC-5.2 faces several barriers that must be overcome to successfully adopt an effective, binding treaty. Of note, the process has been mired in conflicts of interest—an intensifying issue at each negotiating session, and one that is widespread throughout the UN Environment Program (UNEP). The multibillion-dollar plastic and fossil fuel industries, supported by over $80 billion USD in annual global subsidies, have been allowed to exert undue influence over country positions.
In Geneva, a conservatively estimated 234 lobbyists from the plastics and petrochemical industries registered to participate, outnumbering the delegates from the European Union and even securing positions within prominent delegations including China, Egypt, and Iran. With close access to country delegates, lobbyists utilize their positions and marketing tactics to influence country positions and ambition. For example, the plastics industry manufactures doubt on the harms of plastic by heavily marketing their use in medical or technological fields and discrediting science on plastic pollution. In doing so, the plastics industry deflects taking responsibility for the massive amount of single-use plastics that could be reasonably and rapidly replaced by safer alternative materials.
Another major barrier faced by ambitious delegates at INC-5.2 was the consensus-based model that has largely become the default of the negotiations. Throughout the INC process, countries have failed to adopt Rules of Procedure, which would permit voting to avoid stalemates. As a result, a few dissenting countries are allowed to block progress and water down ambition by vetoing substantive decisions for the sake of reaching unanimity. At INC-5.2, a majority of countries agreed upon a multitude of text proposals, including 130 nations that supported text calling for reduction of the production of plastic products containing specific chemicals known to be harmful to people and the environment, while 117 countries agreed to include a standalone article on health, and 52 countries supported a target on reducing plastic production. However, these widely supported commonsense provisions were ultimately not incorporated into the draft text.
Undoubtedly, the majority of countries are ambitiously working to pass a strong treaty that protects people and the planet from plastic pollution. However, a minority coalition, deemed the Like-Minded Group—which includes historically fossil fuel friendly countries such as Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, and Russia—are acting as one of the largest roadblocks, effectively vetoing key treaty elements such as production limits on plastics, chemicals of concern, and binding measures. The United States has shown increasing alignment with the Like-Minded Group.
Opportunities for a Path Forward
Learning from the missteps and obstacles of INC-5.2, several changes are needed to advance a strong plastics treaty and avoid another stalled negotiating session. Notably, implementing voting provisions through the Rules of Procedure during the negotiations can provide a path forward when there are gridlocked debates, allowing member states to advance text that has broad support. The option to vote puts the negotiating power back in the hands of the majority who have been negotiating in good faith throughout this process.
Within the United Nations’ history, as recently as the 2023 adoption of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea on the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Marine Biological Diversity of Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction (BBNJ), the Rules of Procedure have included voting. While the BBNJ text was ultimately reached by consensus, voting was a possibility in the event that unanimity could not be reached. In many instances in international negotiations, just the possibility of voting encourages compromise, and actually calling a vote is saved as a last resort. Voting on treaty texts could look at either simple or two-thirds majority, with the latter more common for procedural actions, as seen in the BBNJ, Rotterdam, and Stockholm conventions.
In addition, it will be important that once a treaty text is reached, that future Conferences of the Parties (COPs)—when countries meet to take stocktakes of their progress and make amendments to the text—include voting provisions. For the COPs, a new set of Rules of Procedure would need to be agreed upon independently by the COP, and voting would help ensure the treaty can be strengthened over time.
Another alternative to reach a stronger treaty is for ambitious countries to coalesce independently of UNEP by forming a “Coalition of the Willing.” Previous Coalitions of the Willing, such as the Ottawa Treaty banning landmines or the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, convened by the International Union for Conservation of Nature, have successfully enacted change when the United Nations process proved unfruitful. While this pathway could lead to a stronger agreement, it also risks leaving out major plastic-producing and polluting countries, which may choose not to join the coalition. Others may oppose this approach out of a desire to preserve environmental multilateralism.
As treaty talks move to an INC-5.3 session and beyond, critical changes will be needed to improve the process. Given the challenges faced at INC-5.2, UNEP, new INC leadership, and ambitious countries must carefully consider the next steps forward to avoid further delays in ending global plastic pollution and enacting a strong UN Plastics Treaty.
